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Abstract: English  
As the economic and social situation declines post US subprime and European 
Sovereign debt Crisis in Europe, especially in Portugal, public authorities have been 
largely ineffective in reviving the economy. Various rescue packages within EU by 
respective governments have failed to fulfil their purpose and the outlook for growth 
and employment remains subdued. The road to recovery needs to be reworked.  A 
reenergized impetus is needed towards Entrepreneurship as we argue that it is equally, 
if not more important when the economy is doing badly. In this backdrop we have 
focussed our study on Managers for two primary reasons. First, they are better 
positioned to be successful in their venture owing to their experience and secondly their 
success in turn would inspire youths to take Entrepreneurship which in turn would 
benefit the economy at large.  We study optimal moment for an incumbent Manager to 
move away from his current job and start his own venture following a Real Options 
approach. A two – factor uncertainty approach based on Adkins and Paxson (2011) is 
adopted. 
Kea words: Entrepreneurship, Manager, Real Options, Economic Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resumo: Português  
Com o declínio da situação económica e social, provocado pela crise do subprime dos 
EUA e da dívida soberana na Europa, especialmente em Portugal, as autoridades 
públicas têm sido, na sua grande parte, ineficazes na revitalização da economia. Os 
vários pacotes de resgate adotados dentro da EU, pelos respetivos governos, não 
conseguiram cumprir o seu objetivo e as perspetivas para o crescimento e criação de 
emprego continuam bastante moderadas. O caminho para a recuperação necessita de ser 
reavaliado. Um revigorado ímpeto do Empreendedorismo é essencial, uma vez que 
argumentamos ser tão ou mais importante quando a situação da economia é 
particularmente má. Neste cenário, focamos o nosso estudo nos Gestores 
essencialmente por duas razões. Em primeiro lugar, estão melhor posicionados para ter 
sucesso no seu empreendimento devido à sua experiência, e em segundo lugar, mas não 
menos importante, o seu sucesso inspiraria jovens a seguir a rota do 
Empreendedorismo, o que por sua vez beneficiaria a economia no seu todo. Estudamos 
o momento ótimo para um gestor executivo deixar o seu trabalho atual e iniciar o seu 
próprio projeto, seguindo uma abordagem de Opções Reais. Foi adotada uma 
abordagem de incerteza de dois fatores Adkins and Paxson (2011). 
Palavras Chave: Empreendedorismo, Gestor, Opções Reais, Desenvolvimento            
Económico.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The advent of US subprime crisis followed by European sovereign debt crisis had led to 
protracted economic downturn in the euro area with the sub-continent struggling in an uphill 
battle against the lingering effects of these crises, grappling in particular with the challenges 
of taking appropriate fiscal and monetary policy actions to stimulate the economy. The 
recovery has been largely falter as the governments struggle with austerity and attempts to 
regain competitiveness. Various rescue packages within EU by respective governments 
aimed at avoiding market panic and restoring investors' confidence have failed to fulfil their 
purpose and the outlook for growth and employment remains subdued and is marked by 
persistent cross country differences. EU figures suggest that around one-in-five young people 
in the EU were unemployed in 2011 whilst youth unemployment in countries such as Greece 
and Spain was over 40 per cent (Eurostat, 2011). In many OECD countries, youth 
unemployment is either at, or close to the maximum level, ever experienced (OECD, 2010)
1
 
Portugal was no exceptions and was one of the countries hit the hardest by Sovereign debt 
crisis. The government responded by implementing rescue plans by injecting capital, 
providing liquidity provisions and guarantees but began to face difficulties to refund their 
own debt starting the beginning of 2010. As a consequence in 2012 they have to take a $105 
billion bailout from the IMF that required the country to cut government spending and raise 
taxes. Owing to Government budget cuts in the run-up to Euro Crisis, Youth unemployment 
reached record highs with a rate of 37.7% (Eurostat, 2011). Also the public finance situation 
no longer allows for large scale stimulus policies, whilst any additional action on the part of 
the Government of Portugal would not be enough to jump-start the economy and create jobs. 
Public policies are in deadlock and the economy is stagnating and this is the cause of concern 
and discontent. And without jobs and growth, the European idea itself is in danger.  
From the discussions above, it can be argued that as the economic and social situation 
declines in Europe and especially in Portugal, public authorities are becoming increasingly 
powerless. That being said the road to recovery needs to be reworked and hence we propose 
that a reenergized impetus is needed towards Entrepreneurship, very few of the time tested 
alternative to revive the economy. Entrepreneurs are equally, if not more, important when the 
                                                          
1
 Figures for „maximum ever‟ are from 1985. 
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economy is doing badly. When unemployment is high and the economy is contracting or 
stagnating, dynamic Entrepreneurship could help turn the economy around. 
Keeping these motivations in mind we have focus our study on most important facet across 
entire Business Industry, The decision Makers: The Managers. “Under what conditions it is 
optimal for incumbent Managers to part ways from their conventional jobs and venture into 
the world of Entrepreneurship”. We will try to explore the idea using Real Options approach. 
One of the prime motivation for selecting “Managers” as a central point of our study is the 
relatively small participation of youths in Entrepreneurship across EU. Figure 1 and Figure 2 
present EU self-employment rates for males and females, respectively, by age over the period 
1987-2010 (OECD, 2010). As per the survey, it could be seen that older rather than younger 
individuals are more likely to be self-employed. In Figure 1, older males (aged 50-64) are 
approximately five times more likely than younger people (aged 15-24) to be self-employed
2
. 
But the Euro Flashbarometer (2011) of the OECD report indicates that about 40 per cent of 
young people would like to become an Entrepreneur signalling that there is a desire among 
youth to take Entrepreneurship.  
Figure 1: EU Male self-employment rates by age, 1987-2011
3
.  
                   
Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey. 
                                                          
2
 This evidence is in contrast to studies that suggest that the relationship between age and self-employment rates 
follows an inverted U shape pattern with young and older people being less likely than „prime age‟ individuals 
(aged 30-50) to be self-employed (Storey & Francis, 2010)This inverted U shape pattern is typically derived 
from the age and age squared (usually taken as a proxy for „experience‟) of the individual and shows a positive 
sign for age but a negative sign for age squared. The relationship, however, between age and self-employment 
may be changing as there is increasing evidence that older people are much more likely to have taken up self-
employed (Storey & Francis, 2010). 
3
 These figures are computed by dividing male self-employment by male employment. If the denominator is 
total population, the percentage of male self-employed amongst young males (15-24 year olds) is about 1 per 
cent across the period 1987-2010. 
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Figure 2: Figure 2: EU Female self-employment rates by age, 1987-2011. 
       
Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey. 
So in this vain, an experienced Manager setting up a new business may provide 
demonstration of learning externalities, in that they may act as a role model for other young 
people. This may be particularly advantageous in current economic state because setting up a 
new business – especially if it goes on to be successful – may signal that Entrepreneurship is 
a potent alternative mechanism and appeal to the concerned parties. We believe such analysis 
has the potential to give incumbent Managers an extra impetus of certainty for them to make 
an informed shift towards Entrepreneurship should they wish to do so and eventually benefit 
society as a whole. Placing Entrepreneurs at the core of economic policy - this is an 
acknowledgement of their fundamental role in reviving growth. 
Having said that the nature of the dissertation is theoretical and it is broadly structured into 
five main sections that build on each other. In Section 1 above, we have very briefly tried to 
present the current economic landscape across EU and Portugal in particular and motivations 
behind the questions we are trying to address in the dissertation. In section 2, rooted in 
Financial and Economics scientific literature, evidence of Entrepreneurship as economic 
growth driver is presented. The gap in the literature concerning application of Real Options 
towards Entrepreneurial venture is highlighted. Section 3 presents the model followed by a 
numerical example in Section 4. Finally, in section 5 we conclude and suggest some natural 
extensions to our model.  
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2. Literature Review  
 
In this section we will briefly look at the most relevant literature concerning Managers and 
Entrepreneurship going side by side and role of Real Options as a decision making platform 
for the incumbent Managers. 
2.1 Entrepreneurship and Economic Development  
 
It has been widely recognized by scholars and policy makers in the USA and Europe, and 
much has been scripted on how Entrepreneurs can promote regional economic development 
(Nolan (2003), Audretsch D. (2009)) Entrepreneurship is „at the heart of national advantage‟ 
(Porter, 1990). It offers an indigenous solution to a country‟s economic problems (De Clercq 
& Honig, 2011).   
Portugal‟s Entrepreneurial renaissance could indeed spur an economic revival as any 
macroeconomic recovery requires either existing companies to grow or new ones to form – 
this is what creates jobs. The view is supported by Audretsch & Fritsch (2002) who in turn 
have argued that high levels of new firm formation should have a stronger impact on 
employment in the regions where existing firms are not growing optimally which happens to 
be the case broadly across Europe.  
2.2 Entrepreneurship and Managers  
 
Much has been written about independent Entrepreneurship, which refers to an individual or 
a group of individuals striking out on their own to start new business. A common theme 
running across the literature concerning the sustained success of their venture is their ability 
of continuously assimilate, process and update industry trends and knowledge in the pursuit 
to finding distinctive ways including newness, novelty or practicality to address 
commercially viable opportunities. New knowledge is developed through a process of 
learning, which is associated with experience that enhances performance (Foil & Lyles, 
1985), (Huber, 1991).  
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Rooted in the evidence presented via above stated literature, we posit that given knowledge is 
at the heart of successful Entrepreneurial life cycle, Managers with their vast experience and 
industry know-how are best positioned to take up Entrepreneurship with greater chances of 
success, should they wish to do so. Executives with experience in an industry have detailed 
knowledge about how that industry operates or have faced issues pertinent to older or larger 
organizations, and thus their experience could be instrumental as the company grows 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), where majority of the start-ups fail.  
With respect to Entrepreneur’s entry timing, numerous measures of performance have been 
used in entry timing research, thus providing some guidance on what may influence the entry 
decision. These measures include profitability (e.g., Abell & Hammond (1979), Rothaermel 
(2001)), survival (e.g., Robinson & Min (2002)), market share (e.g., Szymanski, Troy & 
Bharadwaj (1995)), and multiple measures (e.g., Lambkin (1988), Mitchell (1991)). But most 
of these studies have followed the orthodox rules of investments for making the decision.  
2.3 Real Options approach to Investments 
 
The orthodox theory of investment however has not recognized the important qualitative and 
quantitative implication of interaction between irreversibility, uncertainty, and the choice of 
timing (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). The "standard" Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) / Net Present 
Value (NPV) approach discounts future expected cash flows at a discount rate that reflects 
the embedded risk in the project while implicitly assuming investment decision to be 
"passive" with regard to their Capital Investment once committed. This method does not 
account for changes in risk over the project's lifecycle and hence fail to appropriately adapt 
the risk adjustments. It makes no provision for this flexibility of the project and consequently 
undervalues its benefits (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994).   
By contrast, the Real Options approach posits that investment decisions ought to be treated 
"actively" and should "continuously" be adjusted for market changes (Dixit & Pindyck, 
1994). It values flexibility considers each and every scenario and indicates the best action in 
any of the contingent events by adapting to negative outcomes by decreasing exposure and to 
positive scenarios by scaling up, henceforth benefiting from uncertainty and achieving a 
lower variability of returns than under the NPV stance (Trigeorgis, Brosch, & Smit, 2010). 
The contingent nature of future profits in real option models is captured by employing the 
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techniques developed for financial options in the literature on contingent claims analysis 
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). 
The Real Options literature concerning Managers though has largely focussed on devising 
optimal compensation schemes to balance Agent-owner interests, optimal investment timings 
for incumbent firms under competition (see Cordoso & Pereira (2015), Pereira & Rodrigues 
(2014)) respectively for the latest findings). To the best of our knowledge there remains no 
literature that has addressed its application as decision aiding tool to move towards 
Entrepreneurship by an incumbent Manager or any prospective aspirant for that matter. The 
important point in our study is that the decision to enter is a one-shot action that cannot be 
completely withdrawn from if things go wrong. Thus, the entry contributes to an irreversible 
decision that does not have the characteristic of an updating process. The Real Option 
philosophy could help in addressing that. 
Henceforth there remains a gap in the Real Options literature concerning Managers which 
have we tried to bridge in this dissertation. The advantage of this model is that it leaves 
enough flexibility to be incorporate more variables that could be varied stochastically and 
specific cases can be derived from the general solution, that, in principle, can be found 
analytically, and most importantly, that it paves the way for expanding the analytical scope 
for an incumbent Manager for making an informed switch towards Entrepreneurship or 
aspiring young minds in general. 
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3.  Model Description 
 
We begin by considering that multiple uncertainties surrounds an incumbent Manager while 
considering Entrepreneurship and starting his own venture. These myriad uncertainties are 
broadly consolidated into two sources. First, uncertainty regarding the future cash flow to be 
generated from Entrepreneurial venture and second the cash flow of the company where he is 
presently employed as the Manager.  We represent the cash flow generated in present value 
terms by the Entrepreneurial Venture and the Company as VE and VC respectively. 
We will follow Adkins & Paxson (2011) approach of quasi-analytical solutions based on a 
two-factor uncertainty model, consisting of a set of simultaneous equations considering the 
current benefits enjoyed by incumbent Managers (a fixed salary and variable benefits based 
on performance) and cash flow from the new business should the Manager decides to venture 
as an Entrepreneur as uncertain and varying stochastically. This will help us in determining 
the boundary separating the regions where the value of both variables justify an incumbent 
Manager to either continue with the current job or quit it and venture as an Entrepreneur. 
Given the fact that there is going to be a trade-off between the two stochastic variables and 
only when both triggers will simultaneously be attained at a given investment cost, Manager 
will make the decision to pursue Entrepreneurship, there is going to be a set of countless 
pairs for such triggers (Adkins & Paxson, 2011).  
Hence, in our model, we are going to represent the above stated countless pair of threshold 
values for the stochastic variables as VC* and VE* and also that these pairs defines the 
discriminatory boundary (see Figure 3) that separates the waiting region from the switching 
region. Following Adkins & Paxson (2011), the value of the option to switch and move 
towards Entrepreneurship will depend on both variables, which means that the option will be 
exercised (i.e. the Manager will quit his job and venture as an Entrepreneur) when VE 
becomes sufficiently high for a given VC or VC becomes sufficiently low for a given VE, 
meaning the Manager would take Entrepreneurship when cash flows from the venture 
becomes much large from his current wealth from incumbent job.  On the other hand, if VE is 
not sufficiently large for a given VC or VC is not too low for a given VE; then the Manger will 
not exercise the option to make the switch and continue with his current job. Hence, there is 
going to an optimal boundary composed by a set of pairs for VC and VE which divides the 
region where the Manager will continue with his job from the region where he will make the 
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switch to Entrepreneurship. We are denoting these set of trigger values as {VC*, VE*} and it 
is represented by the straight like in the graph below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  Manager‟s cash flow from Incumbent Job 
Figure 3: Incumbent Manager‟s discriminatory boundary. 
 
Now that we have defined the setup, the two stochastic variables VC and VE follow geometric 
Brownian motion. The variables could be correlated. 
So, 
                                                                                                                                          (1) 
                                                                                                                                         (2) 
                                                                                                                              (3) 
where     and     are instantaneous drift parameters,    the time interval,     and     are 
instantaneous volatility rates for each of the variables with      and      being the 
corresponding increments of standard Wiener processes and ρ is the correlation coefficient 
between VC and VE. 
Under risk-neutrality, we define the value function FM (VC, VE) as the value for Manger’s 
wealth from his current job including the embedded switch (to Entrepreneurship) option and 
this must satisfy the following partial differential equation (Constantinides, 1978). 
Investing Region 
Waiting Region 
{VC*, VE*} 
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Where r is risk-free rate of interest,             denotes Manager‟s annual 
compensation from incumbent job expressed as sum of a fixed component,  and percentage 
  of the cash-flow generated by the company (where he is manger),      .     and     
denotes the dividend-yields for VC and VE and are given by following equations respectively:   
                                                                                                                                   (5) 
                                                                                                                                  (6) 
Equation (4) has a non-homogeneous part, W and the rest of the equation is homogeneous. 
The following general solution satisfies the homogeneous part of the partial differential 
equation (4): 
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where A1, A2, A3 and A4 are arbitrary constants while     ,   ,   ,    are four roots of an 
elliptical equation which is a two factor counterpart of the one factor stochastic model 
quadratic equation presented in Dixit & Pindyck (1994). The equation of the corresponding 
ellipse is given by the following equation (Adkins & Paxson, 2011). 
       
 
 
   
        
 
 
   
                  (     )   
                                                        (     )                                                          (8) 
The above ellipse is distributed over four Cartesian quadrants with each pair of roots 
corresponding to one of them each. Hence, considering the absorbing barriers FM (0, 0) and 
FM (VC,0); A2 = A4 = 0, as it is obvious that the option to invest will be worthless if the present 
value of future cash - flows is zero. Likewise when VC becomes infinitely large for any value 
of VE, the option is as well worthless and the  would be better off with his incumbent Job, so 
to comply with that we set the value of constant A1 = 0, leaving only leaves only one constant 
A3 ≠ 0. Thus, in our case, it‟s the third quadrant which is of our interest, corresponding to the 
pair of roots {       }.  
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Moving on, the following equation further reduces equation (7), the general solution to the 
homogeneous part of the differential equation of Value Function FM (equation (4)):  
                                                   
             
  
  
  
                                                        (9) 
For non-homogeneous part,   
  , we propose the following solution: 
                                                     
                                                                        (10) 
Hence, combining the homogeneous and non-homogeneous part of the solution, we obtain 
the following expression which satisfies the partial differential equation (4) of value function 
FM: 
                      
           
                  
  
  
  
                                (11) 
Applying the Value Matching condition, we obtain the following expression: 
                                
    
       
  
 
  
  
 
      
     
                                     (12) 
where K is the investment cost Manager will incur when he takes on Entrepreneurial 
venture. 
But the above stated value-matching condition does not support homogeneity of degree one 
on both sides meaning;    +    ≠1. So, we follow Adkins and Paxson (2011) quasi-
analytical solution by constructing a set of four simultaneous equations to take care of the 
issue. The first equation will be the value matching condition given by equation (12), the 
second will be the equation of ellipse given by equation (8) and the remaining two are going 
to be obtained by applying smooth-pasting conditions to equation (12). The first of the two is 
the first- order derivative of the value-matching condition with respect to   
  and after 
algebraic manipulations, we obtain the first smooth-pasting condition as:  
                                                 
    
  
 
  
  
 
    
                                                     (13) 
The second smooth-pasting condition is the first-order derivative of the value matching 
condition with respect to   
   and likewise after algebraic manipulations we reach the same 
as: 
                                                        
    
  
 
  
  
 
    
                                                      (14) 
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So using Equation (8), (12), (13) and (14) which form our set of simultaneous equations, we 
will define the Manger’s discriminatory boundary given by a set of countless pairs {  
 ,   
 }. 
This boundary will demarcate the waiting region from the switching region (to 
Entrepreneurship) for the Manager (see Figure 3). Having said that we have five unknowns: 
  ,   
 ,   
 ,   ,    with four simultaneous equations. We will set    
  as a particular value 
and determine the corresponding  ,   
 ,   ,   .  We will repeating the process again and 
again for different values of   
 , hence obtaining a  set of pairs {  
 ,   
 } that defines the 
discriminatory boundary for the Manager.  
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4. Numerical Example 
 
Let us now present a numerical example to illustrate the model. Consider the following value 
of the parameters: 
Table 1: The base case parameters 
Parameter Value 
  1000 
    0.2 
    0.3 
    0.02 
    0.01 
  0.02 
  100 
  0.00 
  0.05 
 
Table 2: The ordered pairs {  
 ,   
 } for optimal cash flow from Entrepreneurial Venture, ,   
  
for a given cash flow of the company,   
  for an incumbent Manager to exercise the Switch 
option. 
 
  
  
12000 
(   =600) 
13000 
(   =650) 
15000 
(   =750) 
20000 
(   =1000) 
25000 
(    =1250) 
30000 
(   =1500) 
  
  7096.47 7324.41 7780.76 8925.3 10073.6 11224.5 
   0.133 0.140 0.157 0.199 0.238 0.277 
   1.316 1.313 1.312 1.307 1.304 1.301 
   -0.112 -0.117 -0.127 -0.147 -0.162 -0.174 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the discriminatory boundary that separates the waiting region from the 
switching region. This optimal boundary is composed of pairs for VC* and VE* which divides 
the region where the Manager will continue with his job from the region where he will make 
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the switch to Entrepreneurship. As is evident from Figure 4, there exists a liner relation 
between relationship between VC* and VE*. So, for a given cash flow of a company, we have 
an optimal level of cash flow that must be generated from the Entrepreneurial Venture (we 
are addressing them as ordered pairs: VC* and VE*) for the Manager to exercise his option to 
switch to Entrepreneurship. So, it is optimal for Manager to exercise the option when the 
cash flow from Entrepreneurial Venture is sufficiently high than his current compensation 
(which is dependent on the company‟s cash flow where he is Manager) or his compensation 
from the incumbent job is too low that possible cash flows from Entrepreneurship. 
 
 
Figure 4: Incumbent Manager‟s discriminatory boundary. 
 
4.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Assuming the same base case parameter‟s value in Table 1 with the exception of the one we 
will vary for the purpose of sensitivity analysis, we are going to analyze how change in 
volatility of cash flows of the company and from Entrepreneurial Venture respectively and 
correlation between them impact optimal trigger.  
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4.1.1 The impact of volatility of Cash flow from the Entrepreneurial 
Venture on the optimal trigger 
 
Table 3 demonstrates how the possible changes in volatility of cash flow from the 
Entrepreneurial Venture affect the optimal trigger for the Manager to exercise his switch 
option. Results included in the table shows that higher volatility levels lead to higher value of 
the optimal trigger. If the cash flows from the Entrepreneurial Venture are volatile, Manger 
will need high trigger to exercise his option. 
 
Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis: The impact of the volatility of cash flow from the 
Entrepreneurial Venture,    on the optimal trigger,   
 . 
 
  
  
12000 15000 20000 25000 30000 
  
  (        ) 5835.28 6411.33 7376.64 8346.45 9319.32 
  
  (       ) 7096.63 7780.76 8925.3 10073.6 11224.5 
  
  (        ) 8550.72 9360 10715 12072.2 13431.5 
  
  (       ) 10202 11156.5 12750.2 14346.6 15944.9 
 
 
4.1.2 The impact of volatility of Cash flow of the Incumbent’s Company 
on the optimal trigger 
 
Table 4 demonstrates how the possible changes in volatility of cash flow of the Incumbent 
Company affect the optimal trigger for the Manager to exercise his switch option. Results 
included in the table shows that higher volatility levels lead to higher value of the optimal 
trigger. Given Manger’s net compensation from the current job depends on the company‟s 
cash flows, it makes sense that the more volatile they are, the more opportunity it gives 
Manager for a higher compensation. So, In this regard yet again, for him/her to exercise the 
switch option, the trigger must be higher. 
15 
 
Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis: The impact of the volatility of cash flow of the incumbent‟s 
company‟s,     on the optimal trigger,   
 .. 
 
  
  
12000 15000 20000 25000 30000 
  
  (        ) 6861.53 7482.68 8520.54 9560.73 10602.5 
  
  (       ) 7096.63 7780.76 8925.3 10073.6 11224.5 
  
  (        ) 7401.62 8167.44 9450.07 10738 12029.6 
  
  (       ) 7778.09 8644.61 10097.1 11556.5 13020.5 
 
 
4.1.3  The impact of the variation in correlation coefficient between the 
two cash flows on optimal trigger 
 
In our numerical example we have assumed possible correlation between the two cash flows. 
As can be seen from Table 5, higher is the correlation between the cash flows lower is the 
trigger and it makes sense because higher correlation signals similar market condition there 
by reducing the level of uncertainty. Henceforth, the Manger would seek lower trigger to 
exercise the switch option. 
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis: The impact of variation of Correlation Coefficients,   on the 
optimal trigger,   
 . 
 
  
  
12000 15000 20000 25000 30000 
  
  (      ) 8046.23 8966.15 10500.2 12036.5 13574.1 
  
  (   ) 7096.47 7780.76 8925.3 10073.6 11224.5 
  
  (     ) 6129 6571.74 7315.32 8064.32 8817.35 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, we built a model following Adkins and Paxson (2011) and arrived at 
optimal timing for an incumbent Manager to exercise the Option (to take on 
Entrepreneurship) when cash flow from the Entrepreneurial Venture and the Company 
where he employed is uncertain and follow Geometric Brownian Motion which are possibly 
correlated.  
We have emphasized the need for Incumbent Managers to take up Entrepreneurship as we 
are of the view that they are better positioned to take the same in the current uncertain 
economic landscape given their vast experience with the hope that their success would in turn 
inspire youths to take Entrepreneurship and this would help in reviving the slumping 
economy. We believe such analysis has the potential to give incumbent managers an extra 
impetus of certainty, encourage them to make an informed shift towards entrepreneurial 
venture should they wish to do so and eventually benefit society as a whole. 
We arrived at the optimal trigger for the Manager to exercise the switch option for a given 
cash flow of the company (We have posited at the beginning that Manager‟s net 
compensation depends on Company‟s cash flow). This discriminatory boundary is 
represented by a set of pair values of the respective cash flows.  
Sensitivity analysis demonstrated that volatility in either of the cash flows lead to increase in 
the trigger while possible correlation between them brings the trigger down. 
Finally, this study can be further adopted to include more or different variables. There are 
many possibilities. As an example the study has the potential to be readily extended to 
regarding optimal timing for young adults to take up entrepreneurship. Also, it can be used by 
the MNC‟s to draft incentive packages to motivate good managers to stay with the company 
rather starting up their own. 
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